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Abstract 
When comparing the speed and extent of economic development in different geographic 
regions of the world over the past 20 years, the under-average performance of Arab coun-
tries in general and Arab Mediterranean countries in particular is striking. This is despite 
an overall favorable geo-strategic situation at the crossroads of three continents, with ex-
cellent connections to sea and waterways and in direct proximity to the European Union, 
one of the world’s economic hubs. It is also despite the minor importance of negative fac-
tors such as a high-burden diseases or high levels of ethnic fractionalization.  
In this paper, I focus on identifying the most important constraints on Arab Mediterranean 
economic development. I use state-of-the-art econometric tools to quantify constraints that 
have been identified through economic theory and studies of the political economy charac-
teristics of the region. The empirical results offer support for the central hypothesis that 
limited technological capacities and political economy structures are the primary con-
straints on economic development. With a view to international structural adjustment ef-
forts, my findings imply that the limited success of the Euro-Mediterranean policy to 
stimulate the economic development of the Arab Mediterranean countries might be be-
cause structural adjustment efforts do not tackle—or at least do not sufficiently tackle—
these constraints. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Hemmnisse wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung im Nahen Osten und in Nordafrika 
Vergleicht man Geschwindigkeit und Umfang der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der ver-
schiedenen Weltregionen in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren, so fällt insbesondere das 
unterdurchschnittliche Abschneiden der arabischen Länder im Allgemeinen und der ara-
bischen Mittlemeerländer im Besonderen ins Auge, und dies trotz einer insgesamt vorteil-
haften geographischen Lage im Schnittpunkt dreier Kontinente mit exzellenten An-
schlussmöglichkeiten an See- und Wasserwege, trotz der direkten Nachbarschaft zum 
Weltwirtschaftsdrehkreuz Europäische Union und trotz der relativ geringen Bedeutung 
wichtiger entwicklungshemmender Faktoren, beispielsweise ethnische Zersplitterung o-
der massive Ausbreitung von Krankheiten wie AIDS oder Malaria. 
In diesem Aufsatz wird versucht, von den unterschiedlichen Hemmfaktoren wirtschaftli-
cher Entwicklung, die in der wirtschaftstheoretischen Literatur und/oder in MENA-
Regionalstudien diskutiert werden, diejenigen herauszuarbeiten, die wirtschaftliche Ent-
wicklung am stärksten behindern oder möglicherweise stärker als andere. Dabei benutze 
ich modernste ökonometrische Verfahren, um den Einfluss der verschiedenen erklärenden 
Variablen zu quantifizieren. Die Ergebnisse stützen die Eingangshypothese, dass insbe-
sondere mangelnde technologische Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten sowie regionalspezifi-
sche politökonomische Strukturen die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in den arabischen Mit-
telmeerländern behindern. 
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1 Introduction 
During the past 20 years, the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa have dis-
played weak overall economic performance and have been less economically attractive in 
comparison to other developing regions. 
Despite the plethora of scholarly articles and publications by international organizations on 
economic development and growth, the contributions on the economic performance of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in general and the Arab MENA (AMENA) countries 
in particular remain limited. Much of the literature uses the aggregate “MENA region,” 
which comprises both Arab and non-Arab economies, such as the EU member and candi-
date countries Malta and Turkey and the highly developed countries Israel and Iran (Sala-I-
Martin/Artadi 2003; Aubert 2004). This article concentrates on the Arab countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa (AMENA) and further differentiates between Arab Mediter-
ranean countries (AMCs) and Arab Gulf countries. The final sample comprises 77 countries, 
including the five AMCs: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.1
                                                     
1  I collected data for a total of 173 countries. A detailed list of countries is provided in annex A.1. 
6 Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 
Figure 1 shows the per capita income of AMENA countries in an international comparison and 
indicates a huge income gap between AMCs and Arab Gulf states that is hidden in the MENA 
aggregate. The countries of the Gulf Council (GCC) have the second-highest per capita income 
in the world, topped only by the high-income OECD countries. In contrast, Arab Mediterranean 
countries have the second-lowest per capita income; only sub-Saharan Africa performs worse. 
Figure 1: GDP per Capita (PPP, USD) 
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
OECD 
Arab Gulf Countries
Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and Caribbean
East Asia and Pacific
Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMC)
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: Brach 2007, calculations are based on WDI 2007 
In a regional comparison, AMENA countries show relatively low rates of economic growth, 
coupled with high rates of population growth, as depicted in Figure 2. Tight labor markets 
in the region face major challenges because average population growth between 2000 and 
2010 is estimated to be more than double that in all other regions (Dasgupta 2003). 
Figure 2: GDP Growth by Regions 
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Source: Brach 2007, calculations are based on WDI 2007. 
 
Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 7 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the low attractiveness of AMENA countries in a regional comparison: 
These countries profit the least from net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Less than 
5 percent of worldwide FDI is directed toward this region. Despite a gradual increase in net 
FDI inflows, the level is significantly below other developing regions. Even sub-Saharan Af-
rica performs better. As for the GCC countries, it must be noted that they are massively ex-
porting FDI. This is, however, not true for AMCs. 
Figure 3: FDI Net Inflows by Regions (billion USD) 
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Source: Brach 2007, calculations are based on WDI 2007. 
Figure 4: MENA Net FDI Inflows (billion USD) 
 
Source: Brach 2007, calculations are based on WDI 2007. 
The oil-dependent Gulf monarchies are an important example of countries in which the high 
income level is not an adequate gauge of technological progress and sustainable intensive 
growth. Despite the large discrepancy in per capita income in Arab Mediterranean and Arab 
Gulf countries, all Arab countries face similar problems, though at different levels of urgency. 
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There is ample economic literature which recognizes the existing growth deficit and weak 
economic performance of MENA countries. However, little research investigates the con-
straints on economic development in the AMENA countries that might explain why they 
perform below their potential. Understanding the most binding constraints to economic de-
velopment and growth is a prerequisite for identifying effective structural adjustment 
measures, both nationally and internationally. National governments, as well as interna-
tional organizations, have only limited financial and administrative resources dedicated to 
structural adjustment and development support. And rarely, if ever, is it possible to tackle 
all possible constraints. Policy makers have to make choices and set priorities to ensure that 
efforts and available resources are directed toward alleviating the most binding constraints. 
This paper aims to partially fill this void. Two-stage cross-country regression models are used 
to identify the importance of different theoretical economic and political economy explanatory 
variables. The discussion then also draws on regional political economy literature and insights 
from MENA regional studies in order to contextualize and interpret the empirical results. 
Two main hypotheses guide the analysis: i) MENA economic development is significantly 
constrained by a lack of technological capacity and a highly inefficient allocation of re-
sources. ii) The inefficient allocation of resources in MENA countries is based on the domes-
tic political economy in each country and results in part from the prevalent socioeconomic 
and political systems of the region. 
The relatively limited body of available literature stresses the poor economic performance 
and development of the Arab world, especially in comparison to other developing regions. 
Despite high oil prices and worldwide increases in energy demand, Arab Gulf countries have 
not been able to channel capital accumulation into intensive sources of growth. Productivity 
remains low and total factor productivity (TFP) hampers rather than advances economic 
growth and development in these countries (Bisat et al. 1997; Abu-Qarn/Abu-Bader 2007). 
There is, however, little agreement as to why Arab countries have mastered globalization so 
poorly. Why are there some highly competitive sectors such as the oil industry, with hardly 
any positive effects on local businesses and social structures, as in the Arab Gulf States, and 
why does the “formal” private sector remain limited despite an active and successful “in-
formal” sector in the MENA region? 
To date, international structural adjustment programs and recommendations to support 
Arab Mediterranean economic development have been primarily inspired by the Washing-
ton Consensus. In principle, the IMF, the World Bank, the United States (Broader Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative), and the European Union (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
or European Neighborhood Policy) have championed programs to increase competition 
from within and outside national borders through privatization and trade openness, respec-
tively. What we know today is that neither national nor international structural adjustment 
measures and programs in the Middle East and North Africa have rendered satisfactory re-
sults: AMENA countries have witnessed a de facto decline in GDP over the past 20 years. In 
order to develop suitable and appropriate strategies for economic development and growth 
from an international as well as a national perspective, it is necessary to specifically target 
those constraints that are most hampering economic development. Unfortunately, it seems 
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that the constraints to economic development in the MENA region have yet to be better 
identified, and support and reform efforts may therefore be targeted in the wrong direction. 
To provide a comprehensive and fresh look at MENA economic development, this paper 
draws on different disciplines and integrates insights from economics, political science, and 
regional studies into a broader analytical framework. The aim of this paper is to test whether 
and to what extent the technological capacities and characteristics of MENA political econo-
mies have explanatory power with respect to economic development and income levels. 
The next section introduces the relevant literature from both economic and regional studies 
perspectives and summarizes the explanatory variables championed in the different strands 
of literature. Section 3 discusses the indicators used for measuring the dependent and inde-
pendent variables, the model specifications, and the data. Ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gressions yield a sense of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. In addition, two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) based on instrumental variables (IV) are used to address reverse causal-
ity, omitted variable bias, possible endogeneity, and measurement problems that restrain the 
accurate interpretation of relationships identified by the OLS regressions. The two stages of 
the estimation procedure will be elaborated in different subsections. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results as well as their interpretation and discussion. Special emphasis is given to 
the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Section 5 provides a conclusion and 
outlines implications for further research. 
2 Related Literature 
2.1 Economic Theory 
Innovation and Growth 
Neoclassical growth theory focuses on physical and human capital accumulation as the ultimate 
sources of growth. In contrast, endogenous growth theorists champion technological progress 
and factor productivity. As a result, growth research has a stronghold on technological innova-
tions and high-technology research and development. However, domestic high-technology in-
dustries and sectors are virtually nonexistent in the context of developing countries. Eighty-five 
percent of innovations have been developed in OECD countries. Even in the USA, high-
technology manufacturing accounts for merely 5 percent of the GDP. The question of how to op-
timize the innovation process in high-technology sectors is subordinate to the more fundamental 
questions of how to trigger and how to accelerate growth in a sustained manner. Due to the lack 
of domestic high-technology sectors in developing countries, the priority of research has shifted 
from generating technology to accessing foreign technology, in particular technology from the 
highly industrialized OECD countries. This is demonstrated by trade economists’ concentration 
on the importance of economic integration and free trade (Frankel/Romer 1999). Some authors, 
such as Sachs and Warner (1999) or Dollar and Kraay (2004), argue that trade integration is the 
major determinant of growth in poor countries because there are no domestic sources of tech-
nology. This view has been challenged by a relatively new strand of literature originally trig-
gered by the seminal paper of Basu and Weil (1998). 
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Technology Adoption and Growth 
Basu and Weil (1998) point to the technological bias towards the needs and framework con-
ditions in highly developed countries where these technologies have been developed. They 
argue that the capacity of developing countries to adapt and adopt foreign technologies is as 
important as access to technologies, since existing technologies are not appropriate for use in 
developing countries. Recent studies empirically validate this model and further emphasize 
the importance of this concept (Acemoglu/Zilibotti 2001; Los/Timmer 2006). 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) compare the process of technology adoption in developing 
countries to the innovation process in industrialized countries. They show that there is no 
“off-the-shelf technology” available to developing countries and that learning about tech-
nology and problem solving using the knowledge acquired in mastering technology is not 
without cost. 
Efficient Allocation of Resources and Growth 
Traditionally, inefficient allocation of resources has been identified as a lack of competition 
caused by monopolistic market structures, high protection against foreign competitors, and 
state domination of sectors or industries. The structural adjustment championed by the Bret-
ton Woods organizations was and still is, despite certain limitations of this approach (cf. e.g. 
Kappel 2003), principally based on the exposure of formally closed economies to international 
competition through trade openness and widespread privatization in to increase competition 
and, concomitantly, the competitiveness of developing economies (World Bank 2006). 
However, a rapidly growing strand of literature supports the view that differences in 
growth and prosperity originate from differences in institutions. Institutions are generally 
described in this paper as the rules and norms of human behavior, following the definition 
provided by North (1989 and 1990). 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) focus on the importance of economic institutions for economic 
growth. They argue that economic institutions that facilitate and encourage factor accumula-
tion, innovation, and the efficient allocation of resources are necessary for societies to be able 
to prosper. Easterly et al. (1997) and more recently Alesina et al. (2003) point to cultural and 
ethic fractionalization as further external sources of differences in economic growth, in addi-
tion to geography and climate. In a widely cited paper Rodrik et al. (2004) integrate these 
diverse arguments into an integrated model and conclude that “institutions rule” over geog-
raphy and trade integration for economic development. 
Political Economy and Growth 
Krueger (1974) was the first to theoretically and empirically outline the economic phenome-
non of rent seeking and its negative consequences. Her findings point to: 1) high deadweight 
loss, 2) a negative perception of the economic system and market mechanism as rewarding 
the rich and well-connected, 3) economic activity that is increasingly devoted to capturing 
gains from rents rather than adopting new technologies and taking entrepreneurial risks. 
Olson (1982) identifies vested interests among individuals specialized in the old technolo-
gies as a major cause of the slowdown in technological progress. He argues that these indi-
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viduals are tempted to collude and exert political pressure in order to delay or prevent in-
novations that might erode their rents. 
Inefficient bureaucratic organizations are also regarded as an important factor retarding eco-
nomic development. In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2006) present an economic theory to 
explain why certain societies end up with such structures. Their findings suggest that an ineffi-
cient state structure 1) allows the rich to use patronage, 2) creates more rents for bureaucrats 
than an efficient state would, and 3) creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. 
Economic theory identifies certain political economy structures that are more likely to ham-
per economic development than others. It is important to note that rent seeking in this con-
text describes the behavior of individual economic and political actors, not the behavior of 
the state. In functioning market structures, individuals direct their efforts to creating and ex-
panding individual profit margins. This can be done in both economic and political spheres. 
Merits and economic profit increase individual prosperity, political influence, and responsi-
bility. In contrast, rent-seeking activities have the same intention, increasing individual profit 
and/or political influence, but draw on a completely different mechanism. Instead of profit-
ability and innovativeness, rent seeking requires long-standing personal relationships. Rent 
seeking is thus not a productive activity—no “value added” is created—but rather a form of 
redistribution. The efforts of individuals are thus channeled to activities such as establishing 
and maintaining complex sociopolitical networks (Buchanan et al. 1980). 
Economies with a high degree of rent seeking are sometimes described as rentier economies. 
As such, the latter concept is directly linked to the neopatrimonial-state literature of political 
science (Lewis 1994; Schlumberger 2005; Erdmann/Engel 2007) but is not identical to this 
rentier-state approach, as will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2 MENA Regional Studies 
In this paper, rent seeking is defined as the individual effort to personally appropriate 
funds, for example, state subsidies, transfer payments, or economic rents generated through 
state intervention and/or monopolistic market structures. I have also presented the negative 
consequences of such a “rent-seeking culture” (Erdmann/Engel 2007). Recent country stud-
ies, based on field research by their authors, have once again stressed that the rent-seeking 
structures outlined in the theoretical framework above exist in all AMCs.2
MENA Polity, Politics, and Political Economy Structures 
Political economy structures in AMENA countries are characteristically different from Euro-
pean or “Northern” economies and political systems, which are generally based on competi-
tion, equality of chances, market mechanisms, and representation. MENA economies are 
better described as rentier economies, where individual economic success depends on per-
sonal networks and successful rent seeking. A large body of MENA regional studies on po-
                                                     
2  Algeria (Nili and Rastad 2007, Lowi 2004), Egypt (Schlumberger 2004, Dobronogov and Iqbal 2005), Jordan 
(Schlumberger 2004, Loewe et al. 2006), Morocco (Cherouki and Ben Ali 2007, Cammett 2007) Syria (Bolbol 
2002, Zorob 2006), and Tunisia (Bechri and Naccache 2007, Bellin 1994, Cammett 2007) 
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litical and economic structures has investigated 1) where these funds/rents stem from and 2) 
why they are widely available. This strand of literature has established that the AMENA 
countries also display a rent dependency at the state level. 
Beblawi and Luciani (1987) developed the concept of the rentier state, in which the nature of 
the state and the legitimation of the government is essentially determined by the nature and 
sources of the state’s revenues. The originally narrow definition of oil rents3 has since been 
broadened. Different rents or nonproductive revenues play an important role in the region. 
The AMCs, which are scarcely endowed with oil and gas resources, in contrast to the Arab 
Gulf countries, depend on official development aid (ODA) and transfer payments at the 
level of the state and on workers’ remittances. Some might argue that FDI is also a form of 
external revenues. However, FDI is an investment, whereas ODA and transfer payments are 
grants. While FDI is allocated to potentially profitable markets and segments, ODA is 
granted for humanitarian or, in the case of the AMCs, geopolitical and conflict situations. 
While the AMCs are underachievers with respect to FDI, more ODA is allocated to the 
MENA region than to any other region in the world (World Bank 2007). 
The remittances that workers who live and work abroad send home to their (extended) 
families directly increase the purchasing power of these individuals, independent of their 
actual labor income. These personal transfers constitute rents, but these have little or no ef-
fect on government revenues because this money is difficult to tax. This is different for rent 
revenues (such as the monopolistic and oil rents of state-owned companies) or external reve-
nues and transfer payments (such as ODA). Since these funds make up an important part of 
their revenues, MENA governments are endowed with significantly more revenues that are 
neither extracted from their societies by taxation nor through economic productivity than 
governments in other developing regions. Governments do not need to justify the consump-
tion or use of their revenues vis-à-vis the taxpayer, nor do they need to reinvest in produc-
tion and economic processes to guarantee high revenues in future. This characteristic is very 
different from the obligations of and constraints on democratic European governments in re-
lation to their tax-paying constituencies with respect to their use of tax-based revenues. 
The polity and politics of the AMENA countries are described as being neopatrimonial po-
litical rule by authoritarian regimes based on a patron-client relationship and an informal 
exercise of power (Pawelka 1993). Recent research confirms the actuality of this political 
characterization as well as the importance of the special link between economic and political 
decision making in MENA countries, stating that the perpetuation of regime stability is pos-
sibly the superordinate objective of political and economic policies in these countries (Beck 
2003). The specific ways in which politics and institutions have interacted with rents are 
shaping the patterns of economic performance in the region (Esfahani 2007; Beck 2007). 
                                                     
3  Understood as the revenues above the opportunity costs in the oil sector. 
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Empirical Studies on MENA Growth 
Despite the plethora of scholarly articles and international organizations' publications on 
economic growth in various countries and regions of the world, the contributions on eco-
nomic growth performance in MENA countries remain limited. Important components of the 
existing literature on MENA growth use the aggregate “MENA region” (Sala-I-Martin/Artadi 
2003; Aubert 2004; Dasgupta 2003). The definition of the region varies significantly from 
study to study but generally covers around twenty countries, including Iran, Turkey and Is-
rael. Consequently, these studies yield only very general and generic observations. 
A few papers investigate MENA economic growth at a more disaggregated level. Bisat et al. 
(1997) provide a detailed analysis of the economic growth rates of ten AMENA countries 
based on a growth accounting exercise (for the years 1971–96). They find that the investment 
process which took place over these years was not accompanied by sufficient improvement 
in total factor productivity (TFP). In fact, the average annual TFP growth was negative over 
the whole period. 
Recently, Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2007) have revisited the sources of MENA growth and 
have attempted to determine the key factors that lead to economic growth in MENA coun-
tries over the period 1960–1998. They found that MENA growth performance was essen-
tially determined by physical capital accumulation and, to a lesser extent, by the accumula-
tion of human capital. The contribution of TFP to economic growth was negligible; all six 
AMENA countries exhibit negative TFP growth. 
Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) address the empirical link between economic re-
form, human capital, and physical infrastructure and MENA economic growth. They find a 
strong positive impact from advances in physical infrastructure and human capital and a 
negative impact from structural reform on growth in six MENA countries over the period 
from 1970 to 1999. 
2.3 The Value Added of Quantitative Analysis 
The two disciplines of economics and regional studies on the Middle East have coexisted 
thus far with very little interaction. This paper attempts to bridge these disciplines and com-
bine insights for a more comprehensive understanding of possible constraints and other fac-
tors hampering economic development in Arab countries. 
Although economists have recognized the difficult economic situation in these countries, it 
seems that they have not been able to sufficiently explain it. 
Economists point to the inefficient allocation of resources as a major clue. Despite consider-
able wealth and capital accumulation in the region, this potential has not been sufficiently 
directed to creating intensive sources of growth and has proved insufficient for supporting 
sustainable development. The answer was formerly (and partially still is) increased competi-
tion among domestic economic actors through privatization and increased openness and 
exposure to international competition through trade and integration into the world market. 
In brief, this mechanism describes the logic behind the structural adjustment measures, pro-
grams, and recommendations introduced by international actors such as the Bretton Woods 
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organizations, that is, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as those 
championed by the European Union in the course of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or 
European Neighborhood Policy. However, the past 20 years have shown that the situation 
in the AMCs has not changed significantly. 
The value added of this paper is the combination of MENA regional studies and economics 
in order to better explain these countries’ development difficulties. The cross-country re-
gression analyses are an important complementary tool for quantifying and weighing the 
importance of several explanatory variables from regional science and economics. 
3 Methodology 
The two hypotheses are tested with two-stage cross-country regressions, based on a sample 
of 173 countries. Unless reported otherwise, all data are from the year 2005. The base year 
for constant US dollar prices in purchasing power parity is 2000. The quantitative data 
analysis is based on cross-country regressions and benchmark comparisons. 
Cross-country Regressions 
The cross-country regressions use the correlation between dependent and independent vari-
ables. In my analysis, log GDP per capita is confronted with different variables identified as 
important for economic development from an economic theory perspective. The aim is to 
analyze their general relationship and find out whether these factors have a positive or 
negative influence on long-term economic development. In addition, the regressions help to 
quantify the degree to which the respective variables matter and to understand the explana-
tory power of the variables (R2). 
Benchmark Comparison 
A benchmark comparison allows for inter- and intraregional country-by-country compari-
son, based on country rankings and regional comparisons. This is an important step in iden-
tifying the level to which MENA growth is affected by constraints. 
3.1 Instrumental Variables Estimation and Two-stage Least Squares 
The reason I do not apply panel data analysis is twofold. The most important constraint is 
the availability of data concerning the key variables, such as quality of economic institutions 
and technological readiness. On the one hand, neither time series nor panel data analysis is 
possible, because important indicators such as the technology or institutional parameters are 
only available for the years after 1995 and 2003, respectively. On the other hand, MENA 
countries have not shown significant changes in the institutional variables over the past ten 
years (Heritage Foundation 2007; CIDCM 2006), which renders both techniques less attrac-
tive. I thus rely on multiple regression analysis. 
Standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, as described above, gives us an idea of the 
fit and the degree of explanatory power of the variables concerned. However, due to endoge-
 
Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 15 
neity, multicollinearity,4 and heteroscedasticity5 concerns, possible measurement and omitted 
variables bias the coefficients and are therefore not entirely accurate. I use instrumental vari-
able methods such as Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions to provide better estimates. 
In this section I outline the concept of Instrumental Variables (IV) and 2SLS regressions, which 
will be employed in the next section. 2SLS is a state-of-the-art instrumental variable method 
for solving the problem of endogeneity of one or more explanatory variables, that is, for mul-
tiple regression models with single or multiple endogenous explanatory variables. In applied 
econometrics, the method of 2SLS is currently the second most popular after OLS estimations. 
When dealing with omitted variable bias, that is, a bias due to unobserved variables that are 
not included, the least satisfactory option is to ignore the problem and accept biased and in-
consistent estimators. In some cases the problem can be solved by using suitable proxy vari-
ables for the unobserved variables. However, in many cases it is not possible to find a suit-
able and good proxy. IV offers a different approach to solving this problem: the unobserved 
variable is left in the error term, but at the same time the presence of the omitted variable is 
recognized. For illustration, consider a linear model with four explanatory variables: 
y = β0 + β1 x1 + β2 x2 + β3 x3 + γ                                                         (1) 
This equation describes a simple regression model which regresses the dependent variable y on 
the independent variables xi, i = 1,2,3, with β0 being the intercept and γ the random error term. In 
this straightforward case, the coefficients β1, β2, and β3 can be estimated with an OLS regression. 
Often when dealing with empirical problems such as the identification of determinants of 
long-term economic development, we find that one or more identified explanatory variables 
are in fact endogenous rather than exogenous. Rather than using x to describe explanatory 
variables in general, I rewrite equation (1) where z and y represent exogenous and endoge-
nous variables, respectively. 
y1 = β0 + β1 y2 + β2 z1 + β3 z2 + u1                                                        (2) 
Testing for Endogeneity 
For those cases where all explanatory variables are exogenous, OLS regressions provide the 
most efficient estimates. If, however, this assumption is violated, we need to apply 2SLS, 
since the OLS coefficient will not be accurate in this case. The test for endogeneity shows 
whether 2SLS is necessary and appropriate. Thus, we need to test whether or not the en-
dogenous explanatory variable y2 correlates with the error term u1. In the case that y2 is un-
correlated (Cov(y2,u1) = 0), OLS estimation is appropriate. If y2 and u1 are correlated 
(Cov(y2,u1) ≠ 0), we need to estimate by 2SLS. 
The Hausman Test directly compares OLS and 2SLS estimates and determines whether these 
differences are statistically significant. If all explanatory variables are exogenous, OLS and 2SLS 
estimates are consistent. The test determines whether the hypothesis that they are correlated is 
                                                     
4  Multicollinearity generally refers to the correlation among the regressors. In the 2SLS context, a special form 
of multicollinearity might arise. Correlations between ŷ2 and the exogenous variables are often higher than 
the correlation between y2 and these variables. 
5  In contrast, for homoscedasticity variance of u1 cannot depend on any of the exogenous variables, i.e., (Cov(z1, 
..., zn, u1) = 0. 
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rejected at a low significance level. In this case we conclude that y2 is endogenous. If an en-
dogenous explanatory variable is identified, the next step is to find an instrumental variable. 
Instrumental Variable 
Since y2 and u are correlated, we need additional information in order to obtain consistent β 
estimators. This information is provided through additional exogenous, observable variables 
z. z is called an instrumental variable for y2 if two assumptions are satisfied: First, z is uncor-
related with u (Cov(z,u) = 0). Rather than through rigorous testing, this assumption must in 
the majority of cases be maintained by appealing to economic behavior.6 Second, the as-
sumption that z is correlated with y2 (Cov(z, y2) ≠ 0) needs to be satisfied. This correlation can 
be tested easily with a simple regression. Because the correlation is complicated by the pres-
ence of the exogenous explanatory variables, partial correlation is tested (π2 ≠ 0 or π3 ≠ 0). 
Both assumptions serve to better identify the regression coefficients β. To obtain the parame-
ters π, the reduced form (3) is estimated by OLS and yields the fitted values. 
y2 = π0 + π1 z1 + π2 z2 + π3 z3 + π4 z4 + v2                                          (3) 
IV estimators with multiple instruments are called two-stage least squares. At the first stage, 
the regression is run to obtain the fitted values ŷ2 of y2. 
123122102 ˆˆˆˆˆ uzzyy ++++= ππππ                                                 (4) 
The following second stage is an OLS regression which uses the fitted values ŷ2 in place of y2. 
y1 = β0 + β1 ŷ2 + β2 z1 + β3 z2 + u1                                                        (5) 
The simple model presented here can easily be extended to a multiple case by adding either 
more exogenous explanatory or endogenous explanatory variables. Consider equations (6) 
and (7), respectively. 
y1 = β0 + β1 y2 + β2 z1 + ... + βk zk-1 + u1                                              (6) 
y1 = β0 + β1 y2 + β2 y3 + β3 z1 + β4 z2 + u1                                            (7) 
In order to estimate a case with the two endogenous explanatory variables y2 and y3, we 
would need at least two additional exogenous variables, possibly z3 and z4. 
                                                     
6  In cases with more than one instrumental variable, overidentification tests provided by some statistical pro-
grams such as STATA can effectively test the correlation with the structural error. Unfortunately, SPSS does 
not offer this feature and other programs such as STATA were not available. Tests will be performed as soon 
as possible. 
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3.2 Model Specifications 
The challenge in every empirical or quantitative paper is multifaceted. Empirical economet-
ric analysis is a very dynamic discipline and, from a regional studies perspective, the state-
of-the-art analytical tool for supporting and complementing qualitative and theoretical re-
search. The aim of this cross- or interdisciplinary paper is to combine state-of-the-art meth-
odology, presented in the previous section, with insights and evidence from MENA regional 
studies, and especially from political science. 
So far, I have (in section 2) described the implications of economic theory literature on de-
velopment and economic growth. I have discussed the limits of these conceptualizations 
against the background and situation in developing versus highly industrialized countries 
(cf. subsection 2.2). I have then identified political economic characteristics that hamper eco-
nomic development and growth in general and I have outlined their importance and preva-
lence in MENA countries in particular. 
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to systematically combining these insights and 
shedding light on the constraints to economic development in the AMENA countries. Prior 
to presenting the empirical results in the next section, I will use this section to comment 
briefly on the individual methodological steps of the empirical analysis: model specification, 
choice of variables, and robustness check. 
The specification of the regression model is an important step, critical to the quality and 
consistency of the empirical results. The challenge of model specification is twofold: first, 
confronting theory with data; second, learning from data, within the boundaries of the cho-
sen model. The theoretical background outlined in section 2 sets the general analytical 
framework. The variables were chosen on the grounds of a solid and well established theo-
retical framework. Economic development in developing country i depends on the quality 
of its economic institutions, its technological capacities, the degree of integration with the 
world economy, the size of the domestic market, and its endowment with natural resources 
such as oil and gas. In addition, economic development in country i is affected by war, in-
ternal as well as cross-border armed conflicts, and finally by its geographic location. 
Generally speaking, the present paper attempts to estimate the following equation, which 
formally presents and summarizes the arguments of the theoretical discussion: 
ECDEVi =  β1 + β2 EconInsti + β3 Technologyi + β4 Opennessi +  
+ β5 Marketsizei + β6 Oildependence + β7 Conflicti +  
+ β8 Geographyi + β9 Region1 + γi                                                      (8) 
The economic development (ECDEV) of country i is the dependent variable and thus is writ-
ten on the left side of the equation. The idea is to find out if (statistical significance), how 
(positive or negative sign), and to what extent (magnitude of coefficient) variations of inde-
pendent variables are able to explain cross-country differences in economic development. β1 
is the intercept and γi the random error term. 
The important independent variables with a potential positive effect, as identified through 
theoretical and empirical contributions are: the quality of economic institutions 
(ECONINST), technological progress (technology), trade integration (Openness), and market 
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size (Market). In contrast, war and conflict (conflict) as well as geography are, particularly in 
developing countries located close to the equator, to have a negative impact. In order to con-
trol for regional differences, a set of regional dummy variables is also included. 
The key variables of interest are economic institutions and technology. Therefore, summa-
rizing a set of control variables in Zi yields the core or benchmark specification, equation (9), 
which stresses that the analysis focuses on our independent variables of particular interest: 
economic institutions, technology, and regional characteristics. 
logGDPi =  β1 + β2 Zi + β3 EconInsti + β4 Technologyi +  
+ β5 Regioni + γi                                                                                 (9) 
To estimate the coefficients, we first need to find out how to actually measure the variables. 
In some cases this is straightforward. Variables such as regional identification are directly 
observable. In other cases well-established proxy variables exist. Economic development is, 
by and large, proxied by the per capita GDP. While the GDP per capita is not just an indica-
tor for the level of economic development, under the assumption that per capita income lev-
els were more or less similar in the very distant past, differences in current income levels re-
flect the diverging growth performance in the long run (Bormann et al. 2006). 
Throughout the literature, there are widely accepted proxy variables for all chosen control 
variables, which are summarized in Table 1. The first variable relates to the mere size of a 
national economy, measured as the total population. Since a larger domestic market is gen-
erally associated with increased business opportunities and a broader basis of human capi-
tal, I expect a positive sign. The next two variables introduce an international dimension of 
economic development. The integration into the global economy as an important determi-
nant of development, both because it enlarges markets and because it is an important chan-
nel for technology transfer, has been discussed in section 2. Here I use the real openness of a 
country as calculated by Summers et al. (2006) as the proxy.7 The internal and external con-
flicts of a country increase the uncertainty for investors and restrict living conditions, and 
this variable is therefore expected to have a negative sign (Collier/Hoffler 2004). 
Table 1: Control Variables and Their Measures 
Variable Measure Variable Name
Size of economy total population in million, 2006 POPUL 
Trade integration the ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (PPP) in US dollars TRADE 
Armed conflict number and intensity of internal and external conflicts CONFL 
Latitude distance of capital city from equator, measured as the absolute value  
of latitude 
DISTEQ 
Oil dependency dummy variable taking the value 1 for a country that is a major oil  
exporter, 0 otherwise 
OILDEP 
The last two variables control for the impact of geographic location on development. Dis-
tance from the equator is a proxy for climate. Economic development in a country with a 
tropical climate is, on the one hand, likely to be constrained due to the high burden of tropi-
                                                     
7  (EX + IM)/GDP per capita (PPP). 
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cal diseases and high morbidity rates (Diamond 1999; Sachs 2001). On the other hand, ex-
treme hot or cold temperatures, temperature changes (such as the night/day change in de-
serts), and high humidity are challenging conditions for specialized machinery, sensitive 
technologies, and research, and thus seem to hamper technological progress. Finally, oil de-
pendency relates to the discussion on rent –seeking; rentier states; Dutch disease; and, last 
but not least, the resource curse literature. 
Key Variables 
For both key variables, economic institutions and technology, there are no established prox-
ies. Nevertheless, there are some suitable possibilities. The most common approach is to 
measure the quality of economic institutions by the extent of existing property rights, as these 
are generally viewed as an important indicator of a reliable and stable economic situation, 
where investors are protected against arbitrariness and expropriation. However, this indica-
tor yields a very narrow definition of economic institutions. In a widely cited contribution, 
North (1990) provides a much broader interpretation of economic institutions, describing 
them as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” and which “as a conse-
quence structure incentives in human exchange whether political, social, or economic.” 
Following this approach, I use a set of indicators to measure economic institutions. Rather 
than developing my own index, I draw partially on the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) 
provided by the Heritage Foundation, which will be briefly introduced in section 3.3. The 
quality of economic institutions is presented as a set of eight indicators which are summa-
rized as a simple average.8
ECONINSTi =  1/8  Σ (Property rights + Business Regulation +  
+    Tariff Openness + Fiscal burden +  
+    Monetary Regime + Capital Markets Restrictions +  
+    Goods Markets Restrictions +  
+    Labor Market Rigidity)                                                            (10) 
Technology is often used as a synonym for innovativeness, and therefore, standard meas-
ures are the number of patents filed by residents, the number of scholarly articles, the num-
ber of scientists per 10,000 inhabitants, and expenditures for research and development 
(R&D). While these measures may be appropriate in the context of highly industrialized 
countries, I have already discussed why they are not appropriate when dealing with devel-
oping economies (cf. section 2). Therefore, there is little sense in applying these indicators. 
Instead, I use technological readiness rather than innovative capacity as a proxy. This choice 
reflects the fact that technological progress in developing countries does not stem a priori 
from technological advances, but rather from the efficient use and adaptation of already ex-
isting technologies. The Global Opinion Survey (GOS) published by the World Economic 
Forum is one of the few sources that allow for a cross-country comparison of international 
competitiveness. Even if technological readiness is not directly observable, the GOS question 
                                                     
8  Originally, the IEF encompasses ten freedoms. However, in this paper I will use similar indicators, corruption 
and the allocative nature of government, as instrumental variables. 
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5.7 “Your country’s level of technological readiness (1  =  generally lags behind most other 
countries, 7  =  is among the world leaders)” is a valuable proxy. 
Table 2 briefly summarizes how the key variables are measured in the first step of the em-
pirical analysis of this paper. 
Table 2: Key Variables 
Variable Measure Variable Name 
Economic institutions  quality of economic institutions is measured as an 
index of the degree of freedom of eight indicators 
ECONINST 
Technological readiness country average of executive opinion survey TECHREAD 
OLS regressions with the above variables will yield important insights on the relationship 
between these and the dependent variable, economic development. 
We know from economic and political economy literature that economic institutions matter. 
In contrast to geography or market size, which are clearly exogenous variables, economic in-
stitutions themselves depend on different factors, and are therefore endogenous rather than 
exogenous variables. Particularly since they are man-made and, to a large extent, chosen by 
the ruling elites. In order to specify economic institutions, I again draw on several important 
determinants that potentially shape national economic institutions, as identified in political 
economy and MENA regional studies literature. 
The economic institutions (ECONINST) of country i depend on the nature of its political in-
stitutions and political rule (Polity), the extent of rent-seeking behavior (RENTSEEK), the al-
locative nature of the state (ALLOSTA), the workers’ remittances received (REMITTAN), the 
endowment with natural resources (OILDEP), and possibly the regional context. Equation 
(11) yields the benchmark specification for the analysis of economic institutions. The proxy 
variables that I use for the chosen independent variables are summarized in Table 3. 
ECONINSTi =  π1 + π2 Polityi + π3 Rentseeki +  
+ π4 Allostai + π5 Remittani +  
+ π5 Oildepi + π5 Regioni + γi                                                          (11) 
Table 3: Economic Institutions: Instrumental Variables 
Variable Measure Variable Name 
Political institutions nature of political rule, measured on a scale  
ranging from authoritarian (-10) to democratic (10)
POLITY 
Allocative state subsidies as percent of government expenditures ALLOSTA 
Oil dependency fuel exports as percent of GDP OILDEP 
Rent seeking corruption as a major constraint to investment RENTSEEK 
Remittances workers' remittances received REMITTAN 
Some might argue that none of these explanatory variables, except the endowment with natu-
ral resources, are exogenous, especially from a political science perspective. This is true; how-
ever, all of these variables tend to only change very slowly and with respect to the AMENA 
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countries have not changed significantly over recent decades. According to the short- to me-
dium-term perspective, the assumption that these factors are exogenous holds true. 
The first two variables relate to the rentier-state debate and literature. Both authoritarian 
rule and the large-scale allocation of resources to subsidies are expected to hamper the effec-
tiveness and quality of economic institutions. The next two variables introduce the rentier-
economy aspect. Whether individuals’ economic effort is directed toward productive or 
nonproductive activities is highly effected by the amount of remittance inflows and the ex-
tent to which personal networks matter in economic and business life. The dependence-on 
oil variable controls for the source of rents, which has received the most attention. But this 
variable is expected to have a small or minimum impact since the AMCs at the center of the 
analysis in this paper are for the most part scarcely endowed with oil and gas resources. 
In line with the methodology discussed above, for the empirical analysis, economic institu-
tions need to be viewed as part of the residual. The specification equation (9) needs to be 
rewritten as: 
logGDPi =  β1 + β2 Zi + β3 Technologyi +  
+ β4 Regioni + ui                                                                               (12) 
Where, ceteris paribus, Zi is the set of control variables and ui is the residual error term. 
Rather than being able to estimate the endogenous variable ECONINST directly, we need to 
use the above-presented instrumental variables to obtain further information. 
Introducing the relevant interaction terms yields the following extended core specification 
which will be the two-baseline model in subsequent OLS regression analysis, combined in 
the 2SLS analysis: where β1 is the intercept and γi the random error term. 
Throughout the paper I will be interested in the sign, magnitude, and significance of the co-
efficients βj, j = 2, ..., 7. 
logGDPi =  β1 + β2 Zi + β3 EconInsti + β4 Technologyi +  
+ β5 Opennessi + β6 MEDi +  
+ β7 EconInsti*Technologyi + γi                                                       (13) 
ECONINSTi =  π1 + π2 Polityi + π3 Rentseeki +  
+ π4 Allostai + π5 Remitani +  
+ π6 Oildepi + π7 Regioni +  
+ π8 MED*Allosta +  
+ π9 MED*Rentseek +  
+ π10 MED*Polity +  
+ π11 MED*Remittances + γi                                                           (14) 
A positive (negative) sign identifies a positive (negative) impact of the respective variable on 
economic development. A negative sign is thus an important indicator of a constraining fac-
tor, a constraint to economic development or the quality of economic institutions, respec-
tively. The magnitude of the coefficient hints at the economic or practical importance of the 
variable and is interpreted as the percentage to which it is able to explain differences in eco-
nomic development across countries. Finally, the significance level is important to achieve 
the correct idea of the explanatory power of the variable. The standard significance levels at 
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the 1, 5 and 10 percent mark are reported. The lower the significance level, the higher the 
chance that the coefficient is not robust against sample changes.9 The aim is to identify 
whether a variable has a positive or negative impact and to weigh the impact and effect of 
the determinants relative to each other (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Variable Description 
Variable Description Kind Source 
Economic development log GDP per capita hard data WDI 
Technological readiness country's level of technological readiness,  
values ranging from 1 to 7 
survey WEF 7.01 
Economic institutions index of economic freedom including ten  
parameters, values ranging from 0 to 100 
survey and  
hard data 
Heritage 
Foundation
Rent seeking corruption as a major constraint to investment survey WDI 
Authoritarian rule 10  =  democratic, -10  =  authoritarian index CIDCM 
Robustness check    
Technological capacity  index of science and technology capacity including 
7 parameters, values ranging from 5.03 to-0.51 
survey and  
hard data 
RAND 
Technological adoption Companies’ ability to absorb new technologies,  
values ranging from 1 to 7 
survey WEF 7.02 
3.3 Data 
Despite substantial improvements, the quality and quantity of data from the Arab countries 
pose important obstacles to advances in research, and this partially explains why this region 
remains marginalized in academic literature. For this reason, I have chosen to use only dis-
closed sources and reports that have been internationally recognized for their reliability. 
The World Bank’s (2007) World Development Indicators (WDIs) provide the most reliable and 
comprehensive set of hard data on the MENA countries. They document the problem of in-
sufficient and unsustained MENA economic growth performance over the past twenty years. 
All of the indices presented below draw on WDIs hard data to complement their survey data. 
The Global Competitiveness Index, published by the World Economic Forum (2007) is based on 
an executive opinion survey (Global Opinion Survey, GOS) of over 10,000 enterprises 
worldwide. In 2003, the GCI, for the first time, covered five AMENA countries. The most re-
cent edition includes 12 AMENA countries. Rather than using the whole index, I draw on 
individual indicators which are undisclosed but which were provided to me by the WEF. 
These comprise the categories technological readiness, process sophistication, innovative 
capacity, quality of education, and quality of universities. These are used mainly as alterna-
tive measures for technological readiness. The subindex technological readiness is also used 
as a measure of robustness. The GOS is one of the most comprehensive and detailed sources 
providing insight into national competitiveness as it is viewed from inside the country. The 
                                                     
9  For my analyses, I operate at the standard 1 to 10 percent level of significance; however, in cases where the 
coefficient shows a large economic importance, I also check the significance at a 15 percent level, as suggested 
by Wooldrige (2003). 
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attractiveness of these data sets is uncontested. However, interpretations of the results need 
to take some important methodological shortcomings into account: The country averages are 
calculated on the basis of the answers from executive officers of firms with more than 100 
employees only (World Economic Forum 2007b). This limits the representativeness of the re-
sults, especially in the case of the Arab countries, where the vast majority of firms are small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) with less than ten employees. Keeping this in mind, the 
WEF data are nevertheless valuable because, in contrast to other sources, the definition of 
technological readiness directly reflects the theoretical discussion on the importance of tech-
nology adoption rather than innovation. WEF data is an important complement to WDI 
data, which focuses on indicators such as R&D expenditure, patents filed, and scientists em-
ployed to reflect the technological dimension of development. These indicators are often not 
applicable in the case of developing countries and are either insignificant or not available, as 
described in the section on technological adoption above.10
In the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation 2007) looks at property rights, which 
are widely used as an indicator of economic institutions. However, this definition is not ap-
propriate for two reasons: international experience from Latin American and East Asian 
countries, respectively, shows that, on the one hand, advances in property rights are no 
guarantee of economic success and that, on the other hand, economic success is not condi-
tional on property rights. For the analysis of the quality of economic institutions in MENA 
countries, I therefore draw on the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), which is based on ten 
areas of economic freedom (government, fiscal, finance, monetary, trade, property rights, 
investment, labor, business, and corruption) compiled from 90 indicators. The index is a 
nonweighted average which draws on the Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index to measure the freedom from corruption. The IEF claims to be the first compre-
hensive study of economic freedom. Its first volume was published in 1995. Despite some 
criticism, mainly due to its simple average nature, the IEF provides a unique tool for com-
paring economic institutions across countries. Some of its shortcomings can be countered by 
not relying on the aggregate index itself but using the individual subindices instead, which I 
do in the analysis presented here. 
The Polity IV Database by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
contains semiannually coded information on regime and authority characteristics for all in-
dependent states (with total population greater than 500,000) in the global state system and 
covers the years 1800–2004. Polity IV codes regime characteristics as the authority patterns of 
effective polity in the arena of conventional politics. Along the 20-point polity scale, which 
ranges from authoritarian (-10) to democratic (10), polity scores are reliable and accurate to 
within one or two points. The Polity IV database provides a classification of regimes and fa-
cilitates the study of regime persistence. Polity IV classification is based on the three general 
categories of authority patterns: executive recruitment, executive constraints, and political 
competition. All variables are explained in detail in the Polity Users' Manual (CIDCM 2006). 
                                                     
10  For an elaborate discussion of the explanation power of GCI for competitiveness, especially in the AMCss, see 
Brach (2007). 
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The Kaufmann et al. (2005) data set is included mainly in order to use their control variables, 
such as distance from equator and landlocked, I have used the Kaufmann et al. data as a 
base, which I have partially updated and, where possible, extended. While the Center for the 
Study of Civil War data set (CSCW 2005) provides information about the number of conflicts 
between 1970 and 2004 for every country, the Penn World Table 6.2 by Summers et al. (2006) 
calculates OPENNESS as the total trade as percentage of GDP. Purchasing power parity 
(PPP) is the number of currency units required to buy goods equivalent to what can be 
bought with one unit in the base country. 
OPENNESS = (EX + IM) : real GDP per capita                            (15) 
Finally, the RAND Index of Science and Technology (IST) (Wagner 2001) complements the in-
formation on technological and scientific capacities from a MENA perspective (as provided 
by the WEF), I include the data from the RAND IST, which is based on a survey of American 
scientists and their perception of the scientific standards and capacities of international co-
operation partners. 
This section’s fairly general description of data sources is complemented by a more detailed 
presentation of the variables in Table 4 and annex A.2. For the robustness check, I partially 
complement the indicators by using additional sources of data. A full specification of the al-
ternative measures is provided in section 4.4. In total, I have collected data for a total of 173 
countries. Due to data restrictions in some countries and variables and list wise exclusion of 
variables, I have N = 103 for OLS and N = 77 for 2SLS regressions, respectively. The final 
sample of 77 countries comprises seven Arab countries: the five AMCs, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan, and the two Arab Gulf states, Oman and Yemen. The full list of 
countries is provided in annex A.1. 
3.4 Verifying the Assumptions and Descriptives 
The quality of any regression results depends on whether the model’s assumptions are (suf-
ficiently) met. 
The assumption of normal distribution and cross-correlations is verified for all variables un-
der investigation. In some cases, monotonous data transformations were used to reduce 
skewness. These transformations only change the shape, and not the order or dimensions, of 
the data. If these assumptions were not fulfilled, neither the OLS nor the 2SLS estimates 
would yield reasonable results. 
A combination of exploratory data analysis (EDA) and more rigorous tests was performed 
separately for each variable and bivariate relationship prior to the multivariate analysis, 
which will be presented in detail in the next section. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest. The first row presents 
the dependent variable per capita GDP as the measure for economic performance and de-
velopment. LGGDP is calculated as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (purchasing 
power parity) in 2000. In the following rows, five explanatory variables are introduced, four 
of which are considered exogenous. 
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OPENNESS is measured using the Penn World Tables ratio (exports plus imports divided 
by real GDP per capita in constant 2000 prices. Given the demonstrated differing character-
istics of highly industrialized and developing countries with respect to innovation vs. tech-
nology adoption, I have chosen to measure technological readiness TECHREAD, which is in 
the WEF’s Global Opinion Survey. Controlling for per capita prosperity heavily based on the 
export of natural resources rather than technological progress, OILDEP is a measure of the 
oil dependence of a country, measured in fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise ex-
ports. Finally, as I focus primarily on economic institutions, with ECONINST I take the 
composite index of economic freedom as provided by the Heritage Foundation as the meas-
ure of institutional quality. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
LGGDP 3.9000 0.44946 77
ECONINST 65.6802 9.28532 77
TECHREAD 4.065 1.1905 77
OPENNESS 87.868 43.5229 77
POP05 48.2295 153.39450 77
FUELEX 15.55 24.524 77
LGCONFL 0.5849 0.71410 77
DISTEQ 32.81 17.515 77
POLITY 531.74 435.103 77
CORRUPTI 54.44 24.005 77
ALLO_SUB 42.69 19.018 77
REMITTAN 3.76 5.827 77
4 Empirical Results 
Simple bivariate relationships between income and its determinants, on the one hand, and the 
quality of economic institutions and their possible determinants, on the other hand, showed a 
clear positive (or negative) relationship, as suggested by the theoretical framework. Any or all 
of them have the potential to explain the level of economic development and economic institu-
tions. These analyses are not reported, but scatter plots are provided in the annex. 
This section presents the empirical results of the more formal tests of these relationships in 
three steps: First, simple OLS regressions of equation (3.8), reported in Table 6. Second, a 
simple OLS regression of equation (3.11), provided in Table 7. Third, a 2SLS estimation pro-
cedure of equation (3.13), which is documented in Table 8. 
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Table 6: OLS 77 Countries—Economic Development (lgGDPPC) 
 Economic Development (lgGDPPC) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
ECONINST 0.67*** 0.23*** 0.21** 0.26*** 0.19* 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
 (7.72) (2.62) (2.23) (2.65) (1.91) (0.58) (0.11) (-0.30) (-0.52) 
TECHREAD  0.65*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.67*** 0.53*** 
  (7.37) (7.24) (7.12) (7.53) (8.50) (8.65) (8.96) (6.57) 
OPENNESS   0.08 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
   (1.17) (1.43) (0.87) (0.43) (0.46) (0.42) (0.30) 
MARKET   0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
   (0.42) (0.65) (0.97) (-0.12) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.24) 
OILDEP    0.12* 0.10*' 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.00 
    (1.79) (1.52) (0.98) (1.05) (0.30) (-0.03) 
LGCONFL     -0.17** -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 
     (-2.32) (-0.59) (-0.46) (-0.96) (-1.41) 
DISTEQ      0.38*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.24** 
      (5.56) (5.75) (5.63) (2.26) 
MED       -0.08 0.43*' 0.39*' 
       (-1.34) (1.51) (1.50) 
INTM_TE        -0.52* -0.46* 
        (-1.81) (-1.72) 
GULF         0.07 
         (1.30) 
SSA         -0.19** 
         (-2.41) 
LAC         0.02 
         (0.30) 
EAP         0.00 
         (0.04) 
OECD         0.22*** 
         (2.87) 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.84 
N 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Note: ***, **, *, and *' denote a significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 15 percent level, respectively. 
Table 7: OLS 77 Countries—Economic Institutions (ECONINST) 
 Economic Institutions (ECONINST) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
POLITY 0.650*** 0.280*** 0.293** 0.292*** 0.193** 0.170* 0.187** 0.146*' 0.280*** 
 (7.402) (3.174) (3.150) (3.272) (2.072) (1.773) (1.958) (1.492) (3.174) 
RENTSEEK  -0.598*** -0.607*** -0.653*** -0.716*** -0.709*** -0.733*** -0.731*** -0.598*** 
  (-6.780) (-6.698) (-7.360) (-8.107) (-8.007) (-7.903) (-7.961) (-6.780) 
ALLO_SUB   -0.037 0.013 -0.002 0.010 -0.016 -0.003 0.00*** 
   (-0.458) (0.168) (-0.030) (0.124) (-0.199) (-0.40) (23.913) 
REMITTAN    0.197*** 0.226*** 0.208*** 0.235*** 0.213*** 0.293*** 
    (2.670) (3.158) (2.829) (3.084) (2.772) (3.150) 
MED     -0.195*** -0.186*** -0.352 -0.233 -0.037 
     (-2.680) (-2.535) (-0.247) (-0.165) (-0.458) 
FUELEX      -0.073  -0.115*' -0.607*** 
      (-1.029)  (-1.511) (-6.698) 
INTM_RE       0.316 0.451  
       (0.517) (0.737)  
INTM_PO       0.110 0.154*'  
       (1.076) (1.462)  
INTM_AL       -0.109 -0.395  
       (-0.079) (-0.285)  
INTM_RM       0.028 0.115  
       (0.058) (0.245)  
ArabGULF         0.00*** 
         (24.209) 
SSA         0.292*** 
         (3.272) 
LAC         -0.653*** 
         (-7.360) 
EAP         0.013 
         (0.168) 
OECD         0.197*** 
         (2.670) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.68 
N 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Note: ***, **, *, and *' denote a significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 15 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions—Economic Development (lgGDPPC) 
 Economic Development (lgGDPPC) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
ECONINST  0.50*** 0.57*** 0.72*** 0.46*** 0.37** 0.16 0.53 -0.63 0.59* -0.51 0.20 0.23 
  (3.87) (3.82) (4.14) (2.80) (1.99) (0.91) (1.33) (-1.20) (1.66) (1.18) (1.03) (1.28) 
TECHREAD 0.82*** 0.49*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.55*** 0.39* 0.99*** 0.35* 0.93*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 
 (15.32) (4.66) (3.88) (2.70) (3.85) (3.95) (5.16) (1.17) (3.43) (1.75) (3.90) (3.47) (3.52) 
OPENNESS   -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 
   (-0.18) (0.26) (-0.10) (0.14) (0.32) (-0.03) (0.51) (-0.20) (0.64) (0.13) (0.05) 
POP05   0.08 0.12 0.06 0.42 0.01 0.07 -0.12 0.08 -0.10 0.00 0.01 
   (1.05) (1.48) (0.86) (0.62) (0.12) (0.72) (-1.07) (0.89) (-1.02) (0.04) (0.11) 
FUELEX    0.20*** 0.15** 0.12* 0.09 0.15* -0.12 0.17** -0.09 0.08 0.10* 
    (2.55) (2.34) (1.72) (0.18) (0.10) (-0.85) (2.10) (0.76) (1.32) (1.73) 
LGCONFL      0.00 -0.02  -0.13  0.13   
      (0.02) (-0.24)  (-1.26)  (1.31)   
DISTEQ     0.26*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.24** 0.53*** 0.23*** 0.50*** 0.21** 0.21* 
     (3.44) (3.66) (4.43) (2.00) (3.52) (1.99) (3.98) (1.97) (1.94) 
MED       -0.04 0.61 -0.08 0.05 0.68* 0.23 -0.01 
       (-0.67) (0.75) (-0.09) (0.47) (1.69) (0.37) (-0.16) 
MED*TECH        -0.05 -1.07*  -0.86* -0.19  
        (-0.11) (-1.78)  (-1.91) (-0.63)  
MED*ECON        -0.53 0.94   -0.06  
        (-0.56) (0.87)   (-0.09)  
GULF            0.05 0.05 
            (0.94) (0.36) 
SSA            -0.17** -0.17** 
            (-2.08) (-2.10) 
LAC            0.03 0.03 
            (0.35) (0.34) 
EAP            0.02 0.03 
            (0.29) (0.37) 
OECD            0.20*** 0.20*** 
            (2.41) (2.47) 
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.80 0.80 
N 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Note: ***, **,and * denote a significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
4.1 Determinants of Development: Results from Simple OLS Regressions 
All explanatory variables—key and control variables—show the expected signs consistently 
throughout the different models. 
Technological readiness has a highly significant, positive impact and a large economic im-
portance. The coefficients suggest that two-thirds of the variation in economic development 
can actually be explained by a country's technological readiness. Even after the inclusion of 
all dummy variables, the importance remains above 50 percent. 
When first being introduced in model 7, the dummy for Arab Mediterranean countries 
(MED) displays a negative sign, but is positive thereafter. The explanation is reasonably 
straightforward: model 7 points out that the generally positive impact of economic institu-
tions, technological readiness, and the control variables might not hold true when analyzing 
economic development in AMCs as compared to other regions of the world, without being 
able to explain why. Models 8 and 9 are able to specify this finding: the negative impact of 
the MED dummy on economic development stems from the negative impact of lacking 
technological readiness. While the MED dummy now has a positive sign, the interaction 
term MED*Technological readiness has a negative sign, and both significant economic and 
significant statistical relevance (-0.52** and -0.46**, in column 8 and 9, respectively). 
In contrast, the impact of economic institutions (ECONINST) changes from positive (col-
umns 1-7) to negative (columns 8 and 9). They also lose significance and magnitude with the 
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successive inclusion of more variables. This may be puzzling at first, but it supports the hy-
pothesis that economic institutions matter and that they are endogenously dependent on 
several determinants, the impact of which can be either in support of or an obstacle to eco-
nomic development. This initial indicative finding needs further investigation and interpre-
tation, which will be provided in section 4.2. 
With respect to identifying the most binding constraints to the economic development of the 
AMCs, the magnitude of the coefficients yields a sense of the potential impact. The bench-
mark model 9, which includes the regional dummies as well as the interaction term, reveals 
within a specification with a solid explanatory power of 84 percent (adjusted R2) that both 
technological readiness and distance from equator in general have a 53 percent and 24 per-
cent return on economic development. Both findings are in line with the importance of these 
two variables as noted in the theoretical section. With respect to the AMCs, the positive im-
pact of technological readiness almost diminishes. Adding the interaction term to the 
TECHREAD coefficient gives the more precise estimate of as little as 0.07, or 7 percent. 
However, when looking at the correlation of the residual and ECONINST, it becomes obvi-
ous that the measure of the quality of economic institutions, ECONINST, is in itself an en-
dogenous variable.11 In order to take this interdependence into account and, at the same 
time, to clarify the importance of its components, I use a two-stage rather than a simple or-
dinary least squares regression. First, I present the results of simple OLS regression on eco-
nomic institutions and their determinants, to once again clarify the impact and relative im-
portance of different variables. 
4.2 Political Economy and Economic Institutions 
ECONINST is identified as an endogenous variable. For several technical reasons, it is not 
appropriate to rely on ECONINST values for the overall regression, but is better to use a 
two-stage estimation strategy instead. For technical reasons do 2SLS results not yield infor-
mation on the impact of different instrumental variables on the endogenous explanatory 
variable. I thus use this section to shed light on the determinants of economic institutions 
from an political economy perspective. In a simple OLS analysis, I regress the measure for 
institutions, ECONINST, on political and political economy variables, such as the nature of a 
country's polity measures, POLITY. The value ranges between 10 (democratic) and -10 
(autocratic) rule. RENTS measures the prevalence and importance of rent-seeking mentali-
ties and structures, drawing on WDI corruption data. Finally, the effect of an inefficient allo-
cation of resources is tested by using ALLOSTA as a measure of the allocative nature of the 
government (subsidies and other transfers as percent of government expenses). The regres-
sion is based on equation (3.8). 
Introducing the interaction terms allows an analysis of the effect of an independent explana-
tory variable on the nature of another independent variable. I look at the interaction terms 
RENTSEEK*MED, ALLOSTA*MED, POLITY*MED, and REMITTAN*MED. One could also 
                                                     
11  The simple, part, and partial correlations are reported in the annex and show a positive correlation with the 
residual. 
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look at differences between economic institutions in OECD and non-OECD countries, using 
the OECD dummy and, alternatively, a separate non-OECD sample (which is not reported). 
A summary of the results is presented in Table 7. 
The benchmark model, which has the largest and most satisfying explanatory power at 69 
percent, includes all four political economy variables and, together with the MED dummy, is 
presented in column 6. Polity structures (0.17), rent-seeking structures (0.21), and the MED 
dummy (-0.19) all display a similar magnitude of approximately 20 percent. However, rent-
seeking structures are economically larger than any other coefficient (-0.71) and thus signifi-
cantly hamper the efficiency of economic institutions—far more than nonauthoritarian struc-
tures positively influence ECONINST. 
After introducing the interaction terms in column 7 and 8, neither the MED dummy nor the 
interaction terms are significant and adjusted R2 is decreasing. Therefore, the coefficients 
must be interpreted with care, even though they support the methodological analysis of the 
previous section. 
4.3 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression 
In this section, I present the results from 2SLS regression analyses. As described above, 2SLS 
allows for the synthesis of the individual OLS regressions. The instrumental variables (rent 
seeking, polity, allocative state functions, etc.) help to identify the economic institutions 
more precisely. The results from the 2SLS regression are summarized in Table 8. 
The explanatory power of the regression analyzes ranges around a satisfying 70 percent. 
Due to differences in measurement, the 2SLS adjusted R2 does not directly compare to the 
adjusted R2 of the simple OLS regressions.12 However, the changes of the adjusted R2 indi-
cate the gain or loss of explanatory power throughout the different models. 
All explanatory variables show the expected signs, although not all of them are statistically 
significant. Columns 1 to 6 represent the general importance of both key variables, economic 
institutions and technological readiness, for all countries in the sample. Both variables are 
constantly significant at a 1 or 5 percent significance level and are economically important, 
as indicated by the magnitudes of 45 and 37 percent of the coefficients of technological 
readiness and economic institutions, respectively, in column 6. The economy's dependency 
on oil as measured in fuel exports is also statistically significant and economically impor-
tant, but it loses importance with the successive introduction of further variables. In con-
trast, the distance from the equator remains important in all models. The inclusion of armed 
conflict (LGCONFL) as a control variable slightly raises the explanatory power from model 
5 to 6, even though the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
When the dummy variable for the Arab Mediterranean countries (MED) is added in model 7 
and included in every subsequent specification, several changes in data need further expla-
nation: The first thing that becomes obvious is that once I control for Arab Mediterranean 
Economic development, economic institutions lose both statistical significance and impor-
                                                     
12  A Shea partial test is necessary to identify the adjusted R2 which compares to the values of simple OLS re-
gression. This test is beyond the scope of SPSS analysis and no other statistical program such as STATA was 
available at the point of writing, but it will be appended as soon as possible. 
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tance. In those cases where the control variable for armed conflict is included (columns 6, 7, 
9, and 11), the effect of economic institutions switches signs and remains negative. For the 
interpretation, I focus more on the models that omit conflict rather than on those that are 
particularly affected by open conflict. The West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and Iraq are not in-
cluded in the sample due to data restrictions. 
Like the results of the simple OLS regressions, the Arab Mediterranean dummy has a negative 
coefficient if the interaction is not further specified (columns 7 and 13). However, the interac-
tion terms explain the negative impact of technological readiness and economic institutions in 
economic development is these countries. This implies that the AMCs are lagging technologi-
cally behind other countries. Adding the MED*TECH interaction term to the TECH coefficient 
yields the factual contribution of technological readiness to economic development in these 
countries. A similar and yet less powerful effect also appears for economic institutions. 
4.4 Robustness Check 
Several robustness checks have been performed, but are not reported. Table 24 in the annex 
provides an overview of the alternative measures used. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tested different determinants of economic development with respect to po-
litical economy characteristics and technological capabilities. The aim of the paper was to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the determinants of and constraints to economic develop-
ment in the AMCs in general and in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt in particular. 
The results of the quantitative analysis support the notion that, in particular, the lack of 
technological readiness and the presence of economic institutions dominated by rent-
seeking behavior constitute the most acute or most binding constraints to economic devel-
opment in these countries. The results also indicate that other factors that have dominated 
the literature on the prospects of Arab Mediterranean economic development in the past, 
such as conflict and trade openness, are clearly secondary. 
The empirical evidence suggests a validation of the second hypothesis, which implies that 
an economically inefficient allocation of resources in the Middle East and North Africa is 
deeply rooted in the political economy structures and is therefore beyond the reach of tradi-
tional structural adjustment measures that aim to reduce market inefficiencies. Structural 
adjustment in the region will only be successful when it is able to reduce these main con-
straints to economic development. The reason international adjustment programs in the re-
gion remain unsuccessful may lie in the fact that they are simply targeting the symptoms 
rather than the causes of low MED economic development. 
The findings of this paper also imply that, in contrast to those of successfully developing 
countries, especially in Asia, MED governments are not dedicated enough to developing their 
own approaches to structural adjustment which build on the authoritarian polity and the acti-
vation of productive potential that has so far been channeled to rent-seeking structures. 
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In the short to medium term neither the authoritarian nature of these countries nor their 
prevalent rent-seeking networks will change dramatically. Structural adjustment efforts 
must therefore take them into account. However, economic development will only gain 
momentum if it is possible to close the productivity and technology gap between the 
AMENA countries and the rest of the world, which will continue to widen unless urgent 
measures are taken. The analysis performed here constitutes an important argument for re-
searchers and national and international policy makers to direct more effort towards under-
standing and fostering technology diffusion within and into these countries, and towards 
investigating their technological capacities in depth. 
32 Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 
Bibliography 
Abu-Qarn, A. S. and S. Abu-Bader (2007): Sources of Growth revisited: Evidence from Se-
lected MENA Countries, in: World Development, Vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 752-771. 
Acemoglu, D. and F. Zilibotti (2001): Productivity Differences, in: The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 116, No. 2, pp. 563-606. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2004): Institutions as the fundamental cause of 
long-run growth, in: NBER Working Paper, Vol. 10481. 
Acemoglu, D., D. Ticchi, and A. Vindigni (2006): Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient 
States, in: NBER Working Paper, Vol. 12748. 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1999): The Political Economy of Technological Change: Vested 
Interests as a Source of Stagnation, in: Aghion, P. and P. Howitt: Endogenous Growth 
Theory, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003): Fractionaliza-
tion, in: Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 155-194. 
Aubert, J. E. (2004): The Challenge: Changing the Growth Model, in: Aubert, J. E. and J.-L. 
Reiffers (eds.): Knowledge Economies in the Middle East and North Africa: Towards 
New Development Strategies, Washington D. C., pp. 5-9. 
Basu, S. and D. N. Weil (1998): Appropriate Technology and Growth, in: Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, pp. 1025-1054. 
Beblawi, H. and G. Luciani (1987): The Rentier State, London. 
Bechri, M. Z. and S. Naccache (2007): The Political Economy of Development Policy in Tunisia, 
in: Nugent, J. and H. Pesaran (eds.): Explaining Growth in the Middle East, Amsterdam, 
pp. 309-334. 
Beck, M. (2003): Resistance to Globalization and limited Liberalization in the Middle East, in: 
Barrios, H., M. Beck, A. Boeckh, and K. Segbers (eds.): Resistance to Globalization—
Political Struggle and Cultural Resilience in the Middle East, Russia and Latin America, 
Münster, pp. 14-33. 
Bisat, A., M. El-Erian, and T. Helbling (1997): Growth, Investment, and Saving in the Arab 
Economies, in: IMF Working Papers, No. 85. 
Bolbol, A. A. (2002): The Syrain Economy: An Assessment of its Macroeconomic and Finan-
cial Development 1974-99, in: Journal of Development and Economic Policies, Vol. 4, 
No. 2, pp. 1-23. 
Bormann, A., M. Busse, and S. Neuhaus (2006): Institutional Quality and the Gains from 
Trade, in: Kyklos, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 345-368. 
Brach, J. (2007): Die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der arabischen Mittelmeerländer im internationa-
len Vergleich, in: GIGA Focus Nahost, No. 12, Hamburg: GIGA. 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (2007), Polity IV Data Set, 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity (access February, 2 2008). 
 
Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 33 
Center for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) (2005), Dataset on Armed Conflict, www.prio.no/ 
cscw/datasets (access February 11, 2008). 
Cherakaoui, M. and D. Ben Ali (2007): The Political Economy of Growth in Morocco, in: 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 46, pp. 741-761. 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004): Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies, in: Euro-
pean Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 1125-1145. 
Cornelius, P. K. and A. M. Warner (2003): Engines of Growth for the Arab World, in: World 
Economic Forum (ed.): The Arab World Competitiveness Report, Oxford, pp. 2-21. 
Dasgupta, D. (2003): Shifting to new Sources of Growth, in: Dasgupta, D. and M. K. Nabli: 
Trade, Investment, and development in the Middle East and North Africa: Engaging 
with the World, Washington D. C., pp. 19-25. 
Diamond, J. (1999): Guns, Germs, and Steel—the Fate of Human Societies, New York, Norton. 
Dobronogov, A. and F. Iqbal (2005): Economic Growth in Egypt: Constraints and Determi-
nants, in: World Bank Working Paper Series, Vol. 42, No. 34510. 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2002): Institutions, Trade, and Growth, in: Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Vol. 50, pp. 133-162. 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2004): Trade, Growth, and Poverty, in: The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 114, No. 493, pp. 22-49. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997): Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 1203-1249. 
Erdmann, G. and U.Engel (2007): Neopatrimonialism Recinsidered: Critical Review and Elab-
oration of an Elusive Concept, in: Journal of Commen Wealth and Comparative Studies, 
Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 95-119. 
Esfahani, H. S. (2007): A Reexamination of the Political Economy of Growth in MENA coun-
tries, in: Nugent, J. and H. Pesaran (eds.): Explaining Growth in the Middle East, Am-
sterdam, pp. 61-102. 
Frankel, J. A. and D. Romer (1999): Does Trade Cause Growth?, in: The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 379-399. 
Hausmann, R. and D. Rodrik (2003): Economic Development as a self-discovery, in: Journal 
of Development Economics, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 603-633. 
Heritage Foundation (2007): Economic Freedom, Washington D. C. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2005): Governance Matters IV: Governance Indi-
cators for 1994-2004, in: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3630, associated 
online data set: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ (access February 2, 2008). 
Krueger, A. O. (1974): The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, in: American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 291-303. 
Los, B. and M. Timmer (2006): The 'appropriate technology' explanation of productivity 
growth differentials: An empirical Approach, in: Journal of Development Economics, 
Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 517-53. 
34 Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 
Marks, J. (1993); Tunisia, in: T. Niblock and E. Murphy (eds.): Economic and Ploitical Liber-
alization in the Middle East, London. 
Nabli, M. K. and M.-A. Véganzonès-Varoundakis (2007): Reform Complementarities and Eco-
nomic Growth in the Middle East and North Africa, in: Journal of International Develop-
ment, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 17-54. 
Niblock, T. and E. Murphy (1993): Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, 
London. 
Nili, M. and M. Rastad (2007): Addressing the Growth Failure of the Oil Economies: The Role 
of Financial Development, in: Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 46, No. 5, 
pp. 726-740. 
North, D. C. (1989): Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction, in: World 
Development, Vol. 17, No. 9, pp. 1319-1322. 
North, D. C. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York. 
Olson, M. (1982): The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Heaven. 
Pawelka, P. (1993): Der Vordere Orient und die Internationale Politik, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Research and Development Corporation (RAND) (2001): Wagener, C., I. Brahmakulam, B. 
Jackson, A. Wong, and T. Yoda: Science and Technology Collaboration: Building Capaci-
ties in Developing Countries, Santa Monica. 
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian, and F. Trebbi (2004): Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institu-
tions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, in: Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 131-165. 
Sachs, J. (2001): The Curse of Natural Resources, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 45, 
No. 4/6, pp. 827-838. 
Sachs, J. and A. Warner (1999): The big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth, in: Jour-
nal of Development Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 43-76. 
Sala-I-Martin, X. and E. V. Artadi (2003): Economic Growth and Investment in the Arab 
World, in: World Economic Forum (eds.): The Arab World Competitiveness Report, Ox-
ford, pp. 22-33. 
Schlumberger, O. (2004): Patrimonial Capitalism: Economic Reform and Economic Order in 
the Arab World, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Tübingen. 
Summers, R., A. Heston, and B. Aten (2006): Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for Interna-
tional Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
data set: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (access February 2, 2008). 
Woolridge Econometric Analysis. 
World Bank (2007): World Development Indicators, Washinghton D. C. 
World Economic Forum (2007a): Arab World Competitiveness Report, Davos. 
World Economic Forum (2007b): Global Competitiveness Report, Davos. 
Zorob, A. (2006): Syrien im Spannungsfeld zwischen der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft 
und der Großen Arabischen Freihandelszone, Bochum. 
 
Brach: Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa 35 
A Annex 
A.1 List of Countries 
Table 9: Regression sample: N = 77 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burk-
ina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen 
Note: Arab Gulf countries are indicated with bold type; Arab Mediterranean countries in bold italics. 
Table 10: Full Sample N = 173 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, People's Republic of, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Democratic Peo-
ple´s Republic of (North Korea), Korea, Republic of (South Korea), Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lat-
via, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, 
Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Note: The member countries of the OECD are indicated with italics. Arab Gulf countries are in bold type; 
Arab Mediterranean countries in bold italics. 
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A.2 Variables: Definition and Data Sources 
Table 11: Variables and Sources 
Variable Description 
LGGDP logarithm of gross domestic product per capita in constant US dollars, purchasing power parity 
(PPP). Baseline year 2000 (World Bank 2007) 
CONFL number and intensity of internal and external conflicts (CSCW 2005) 
DISTEQ distance of capital city from equator, measured as the absolute value of latitude (Dollar/Kray 
2002) 
LANDLOCK dummy variable taking value 1 for countries without access to the sea, 0 otherwise (Dollar/Kray 
2002) 
OILDEP dummy variable taking the value 1 for a country being a major oil exporter, 0 otherwise 
OPENNESS natural logarithm of real openness, which is given by the ratio of nominal imports plus exports to 
GDP (PPP) in US dollars (Summers et al. 2006) 
POP population in million, 2006 (World Bank 2007) 
TECHREAD a country's level of technological readiness, values ranging from 1 to 7 (WEF 2007b) 
ECONINST composite index of economic freedom, including a set of six indicators of economic institutions: 
business regulations, fiscal burden, property rights, restrictions on investment, capital market re-
strictions, and labor market rigidity. Values range from 0 to 100, combining survey and hard data 
(Heritage Foundation 2007). 
RENTSEEK corruption as a major constraint to investment, executive opinion survey (World Bank 2007) 
ALLOSTA allocative nature of the state measured as the compensation of employees, subsidies, and other 
transfers as percent of government expenses (World Bank 2007) 
AUTHOR authoritarian nature of the state. Composite index of three general patterns of regime authority: 
executive recruitment, executive constraints, and political competition. The index value ranges on 
a twenty point scale from 10 = democratic to -10 = authoritarian rule (CIDCM 2006). 
Table 12: Regional Dummy Variables 
Variable Description 
D_LAC dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country belongs to Latin America and Caribbean,  
0 otherwise 
D_EAP dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country belongs to East Asia and Pacific,  
0 otherwise 
D_ECA dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country belongs to Europe and Central Asia,  
0 otherwise 
D_SSA dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country belongs to sub-Saharan Africa,  
0 otherwise 
D_OECD dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country is member of Organization for Economic  
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 0 otherwise 
D_GCC dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country is member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
0 otherwise 
D_MED dummy variable taking the value 1 if a country is an Arab Mediterranean Country,  
0 otherwise 
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A.3 Regression Output 
A.3.1 Simple OLS Regressions: Economic Development 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
LGGDP 3.9000 .44946 77
IEFOF8 66.6802 9.28532 77
TECHREAD 4.065 1.1905 77
OPENNESS 87.868 43.5229 77
POP05 48.2295 153.39450 77
FUELEX 15.55 24.524 77
LGCONFL .5849 .71410 77
DISTEQ 32.81 17.515 77
MED .06 .248 77
INTM_TE .2469 .96364 77
GULF .01 .114 77
SSA .10 .307 77
LAC .17 .377 77
EAP .10 .307 77
OECD .31 .466 77
Table 14: Correlations: OLS Regressions Development 
  LGGDP IEFOF8 TECHREAD OPENNESS POP05 FUELEX LGCONFL DISTEQ MED INTM_TE GULF SSA LAC EAP OECD
LGGDP 1.000 .665 .805 .276 -.043 -.052 -.364 .673 -.110 -.106 .062 -.547 -.142 -.068 .728 
IEFOF8 .665 1.000 .666 .336 -.195 -.289 -.391 .510 -.277 -.262 -.021 -.256 -.028 -.228 .612 
TECHREAD .805 .666 1.000 .196 -.022 -.125 -.184 .389 -.059 -.023 .039 -.370 -.042 .052 .612 
OPENNESS .276 .336 .196 1.000 -.190 -.213 -.345 .287 -.065 -.046 .021 -.232 -.242 .115 .134 
POP05 -.043 -.195 -.022 -.190 1.000 -.035 .246 .010 -.031 -.034 -.034 -.054 -.101 .383 -.056 
FUELEX -.052 -.289 -.125 -.213 -.035 1.000 .025 -.026 .169 .098 .245 -.068 -.070 .080 -.156 
LGCONFL -.364 -.391 -.184 -.345 .246 .025 1.000 -.481 .118 .076 .018 .034 .153 .238 -.355 
DISTEQ .673 .510 .389 .287 .010 -.026 -.481 1.000 .003 .002 -.065 -.473 -.387 -.307 .567 
MED -.110 -.277 -.059 -.065 -.031 .169 .118 .003 1.000 .979 -.030 -.090 -.119 -.090 -.177 
INTM_TE -.106 -.262 -.023 -.046 -.034 .098 .076 .002 .979 1.000 -.030 -.088 -.116 -.088 -.174 
GULF .062 -.021 .039 .021 -.034 .245 .018 -.065 -.030 -.030 1.000 -.039 -.052 -.039 -.077 
SSA -.547 -.256 -.370 -.232 -.054 -.068 .034 -.473 -.090 -.088 -.039 1.000 -.153 -.116 -.229 
LAC -.142 -.028 -.042 -.242 -.101 -.070 .153 -.387 -.119 -.116 -.052 -.153 1.000 -.153 -.303 
EAP -.068 -.228 .052 .115 .383 .080 .238 -.307 -.090 -.088 -.039 -.116 -.153 1.000 -.137 
Pearson  
Correlation 
OECD .728 .612 .612 .134 -.056 -.156 -.355 .567 -.177 -.174 -.077 -.229 -.303 -.137 1.000 
LGGDP . .000 .000 .008 .357 .327 .001 .000 .170 .180 .295 .000 .108 .280 .000 
IEFOF8 .000 . .000 .001 .045 .005 .000 .000 .007 .011 .429 .012 .405 .023 .000 
TECHREAD .000 .000 . .043 .425 .139 .055 .000 .306 .421 .367 .000 .360 .327 .000 
OPENNESS .008 .001 .043 . .049 .031 .001 .006 .286 .345 .428 .021 .017 .160 .122 
POP05 .357 .045 .425 .049 . .381 .015 .466 .396 .386 .383 .320 .190 .000 .315 
FUELEX .327 .005 .139 .031 .381 . .414 .410 .071 .198 .016 .280 .274 .244 .088 
LGCONFL .001 .000 .055 .001 .015 .414 . .000 .153 .255 .437 .384 .092 .019 .001 
DISTEQ .000 .000 .000 .006 .466 .410 .000 . .490 .494 .288 .000 .000 .003 .000 
MED .170 .007 .306 .286 .396 .071 .153 .490 . .000 .397 .219 .152 .219 .061 
INTM_TE .180 .011 .421 .345 .386 .198 .255 .494 .000 . .399 .224 .157 .224 .066 
GULF .295 .429 .367 .428 .383 .016 .437 .288 .397 .399 . .368 .328 .368 .252 
SSA .000 .012 .000 .021 .320 .280 .384 .000 .219 .224 .368 . .091 .158 .023 
LAC .108 .405 .360 .017 .190 .274 .092 .000 .152 .157 .328 .091 . .091 .004 
EAP .280 .023 .327 .160 .000 .244 .019 .003 .219 .224 .368 .158 .091 . .117 
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
OECD .000 .000 .000 .122 .315 .088 .001 .000 .061 .066 .252 .023 .004 .117 . 
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Table 15: Model Summary 
Model R R2 Adjusted 
R2
Std. Error  
of the Estimate 
1 .665a .443 .435 .33773 
2 .824b .679 .670 .25821 
3 .828c .685 .667 .25919 
4 .836d .699 .677 .25532 
5 .849e .720 .696 .24777 
6 .898f .807 .787 .20736 
7 .901g .812 .790 .20615 
8 .906h .821 .796 .20277 
9 .930i .865 .835 .18268 
a Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8 
b Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD 
c Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS 
d Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS, FUELEX 
e Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS, FUELEX, LGCONFL 
f Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS, FUELEX, LGCONFL, DISTEQ 
g Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS, FUELEX, LGCONFL, DISTEQ, MED 
h Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS, FUELEX, LGCONFL, DISTEQ, MED, INTM_TE 
i Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, POP05, OPENNESS, FUELEX, LGCONFL, DISTEQ, MED, INTM_TE, GULF, 
LAC, EAP, OECD, SSA 
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Table 16: Coefficients, lgGDP 
  
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1.752 .281  6.239 .000 
 IEFOF8 3.221E-02 .004 .665 7.720 .000 
2 (Constant) 2.153 .221  9.719 .000 
 IEFOF8 1.122E-02 .004 .232 2.624 .011 
 TECHREAD .246 .033 .651 7.370 .000 
3 (Constant) 2.144 .231  9.302 .000 
 IEFOF8 1.019E-02 .005 .210 2.232 .029 
 TECHREAD .245 .034 .650 7.244 .000 
 OPENNESS 8.583E-04 .001 .083 1.173 .245 
 POP05 8.363E-05 .000 .029 .415 .679 
4 (Constant) 1.973 .247  8.004 .000 
 IEFOF8 1.234E-02 .005 .255 2.652 .010 
 TECHREAD .239 .034 .632 7.116 .000 
 OPENNESS 1.044E-03 .001 .101 1.433 .156 
 POP05 1.308E-04 .000 .045 .653 .516 
 FUELEX 2.278E-03 .001 .124 1.787 .078 
5 (Constant) 2.263 .270  8.387 .000 
 IEFOF8 9.061E-03 .005 .187 1.914 .060 
 TECHREAD .246 .033 .652 7.526 .000 
 OPENNESS 6.329E-04 .001 .061 .868 .388 
 POP05 1.910E-04 .000 .065 .974 .333 
 FUELEX 1.899E-03 .001 .104 1.522 .132 
 LGCONFL -.106 .046 -.169 -2.323 .023 
6 (Constant) 2.444 .228  10.713 .000 
 IEFOF8 2.415E-03 .004 .050 .584 .561 
 TECHREAD .233 .027 .618 8.496 .000 
 OPENNESS 2.650E-04 .001 .026 .432 .667 
 POP05 -1.953E-05 .000 -.007 -.116 .908 
 FUELEX 1.031E-03 .001 .056 .977 .332 
 LGCONFL -2.406E-02 .041 -.038 -.586 .560 
 DISTEQ 9.813E-03 .002 .382 5.563 .000 
7 (Constant) 2.537 .237  10.696 .000 
 IEFOF8 4.817E-04 .004 .010 .111 .912 
 TECHREAD .240 .028 .635 8.650 .000 
 OPENNESS 2.801E-04 .001 .027 .459 .648 
 POP05 -5.364E-05 .000 -.018 -.317 .752 
 FUELEX 1.099E-03 .001 .060 1.046 .299 
 LGCONFL -1.871E-02 .041 -.030 -.456 .650 
 DISTEQ 1.028E-02 .002 .400 5.750 .000 
 MED -.140 .104 -.077 -1.345 .183 
8 (Constant) 2.639 .240  10.997 .000 
 IEFOF8 -1.339E-03 .004 -.028 -.304 .762 
 TECHREAD .254 .028 .672 8.957 .000 
 OPENNESS 2.534E-04 .001 .025 .422 .674 
 POP05 -5.876E-05 .000 -.020 -.353 .725 
 FUELEX 3.374E-04 .001 .018 .302 .763 
 LGCONFL -4.017E-02 .042 -.064 -.956 .343 
 DISTEQ 9.955E-03 .002 .388 5.634 .000 
 MED .785 .520 .433 1.510 .136 
 INTM_TE -.242 .133 -.519 -1.813 .074 
9 (Constant) 3.016 .247  12.205 .000 
 IEFOF8 -2.151E-03 .004 -.044 -.524 .602 
 TECHREAD .198 .030 .526 6.569 .000 
 OPENNESS 1.929E-04 .001 .019 .305 .762 
 POP05 -3.965E-05 .000 -.014 -.235 .815 
 FUELEX -3.403E-05 .001 -.002 -.031 .975 
 LGCONFL -5.824E-02 .041 -.093 -1.406 .165 
 DISTEQ 6.134E-03 .003 .239 2.264 .027 
 MED .713 .477 .394 1.497 .140 
 INTM_TE -.213 .124 -.457 -1.723 .090 
 GULF .264 .202 .067 1.303 .198 
 SSA -.280 .116 -.191 -2.405 .019 
 LAC 2.788E-02 .094 .023 .297 .768 
 EAP 4.564E-03 .110 .003 .042 .967 
 OECD .213 .074 .221 2.874 .006 
Note: Dependent variable: LGGDP. 
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A.3.2 Simple OLS Regressions: Economic Institutions 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
IEFOF8 66.6802 9.28532 77
TR3_POLI 531.74 435.103 77
CORRUPTI 54.44 24.005 77
ALLO_SUB 42.69 19.018 77
REMITTAN 3.76 5.827 77
MED .06 .248 77
FUELEX 15.55 24.524 77
INTM_RE 3.9740 15.41955 77
INTM_PO -6.4416 35.23250 77
INTM_AL 2.6577 10.43351 77
INTM_RM .5315 2.57165 77
Table 18: Correlations: OLS Regressions Institutions 
  IEFOF8 TR3_POLI CORRUPTI ALLO_SUB REMITTAN MED FUELEX INTM_RE INTM_PO INTM_AL INTM_RM
IEFOF8 1.000 .650 -.771 .368 -.111 -.277 -.289 -.290 .269 -.247 -.163 
TR3_POLI .650 1.000 -.618 .481 -.266 -.385 -.283 -.383 .310 -.371 -.298 
CORRUPTI -.771 -.618 1.000 -.436 .345 .075 .147 .093 -.083 .053 .014 
ALLO_SUB .368 .481 -.436 1.000 -.359 -.237 .027 -.213 .203 -.268 -.299 
REMITTAN -.111 -.266 .345 -.359 1.000 .201 -.161 .167 -.110 .256 .325 
MED -.277 -.385 .075 -.237 .201 1.000 .169 .984 -.698 .973 .789 
FUELEX -.289 -.283 .147 .027 -.161 .169 1.000 .214 -.040 .100 -.023 
INTM_RE -.290 -.383 .093 -.213 .167 .984 .214 1.000 -.736 .928 .707 
INTM_PO .269 .310 -.083 .203 -.110 -.698 -.040 -.736 1.000 -.640 -.482 
INTM_AL -.247 -.371 .053 -.268 .256 .973 .100 .928 -.640 1.000 .905 
Pearson  
Correlation 
INTM_RM -.163 -.298 .014 -.299 .325 .789 -.023 .707 -.482 .905 1.000 
Table 19: Model Summary 
     Change  
Statistics 
Model R R2 Adjusted 
R2  
Std. Error  
of the Estimate 
R2  
Change
F  
Change 
Sig. F  
Change 
1 .650a .422 .414 7.10543 .422 54.785 .000 
2 .802b .644 .634 5.61815 .221 45.965 .000 
3 .803c .645 .630 5.64838 .001 .210 .648 
4 .823d .677 .659 5.42524 .032 7.128 .009 
5 .840e .706 .686 5.20634 .030 7.182 .009 
6 .843f .711 .686 5.20415 .004 1.060 .307 
7 .850g .722 .680 5.25438 .011 .667 .617 
Note: Dependent variable: IEFOF8. 
a Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI 
b Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI, CORRUPTI 
c Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI, CORRUPTI, ALLO_SUB 
d Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI, CORRUPTI, ALLO_SUB, REMITTAN 
e Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI, CORRUPTI, ALLO_SUB, REMITTAN, MED 
f Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI, CORRUPTI, ALLO_SUB, REMITTAN, MED, FUELEX 
g Predictors: (Constant), TR3_POLI, CORRUPTI, ALLO_SUB, REMITTAN, MED, FUELEX, INTM_PO, INTM_RM, 
INTM_RE, INTM_AL 
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Table 20: Coefficients, ECONINST 
  Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 59.308 1.284  46.201 .000 
 TR3_POLI 1.387E-02 .002 .650 7.402 .000 
2 (Constant) 76.101 2.677  28.429 .000 
 TR3_POLI 5.978E-03 .002 .280 3.174 .002 
 CORRUPTI -.231 .034 -.598 -6.780 .000 
3 (Constant) 76.908 3.216  23.913 .000 
 TR3_POLI 6.251E-03 .002 .293 3.150 .002 
 CORRUPTI -.235 .035 -.607 -6.698 .000 
 ALLO_SUB -1.819E-02 .040 -.037 -.458 .648 
4 (Constant) 75.649 3.125  24.209 .000 
 TR3_POLI 6.237E-03 .002 .292 3.272 .002 
 CORRUPTI -.252 .034 -.653 -7.360 .000 
 ALLO_SUB 6.582E-03 .039 .013 .168 .867 
 REMITTAN .313 .117 .197 2.670 .009 
5 (Constant) 78.736 3.212  24.510 .000 
 TR3_POLI 4.127E-03 .002 .193 2.072 .042 
 CORRUPTI -.277 .034 -.716 -8.107 .000 
 ALLO_SUB -1.120E-03 .038 -.002 -.030 .976 
 REMITTAN .360 .114 .226 3.158 .002 
 MED -7.306 2.726 -.195 -2.680 .009 
6 (Constant) 79.113 3.232  24.479 .000 
 TR3_POLI 3.632E-03 .002 .170 1.773 .081 
 CORRUPTI -.274 .034 -.709 -8.007 .000 
 ALLO_SUB 4.744E-03 .038 .010 .124 .901 
 REMITTAN .332 .117 .208 2.829 .006 
 MED -6.960 2.746 -.186 -2.535 .013 
 FUELEX -2.750E-02 .027 -.073 -1.029 .307 
7 (Constant) 80.346 3.385  23.738 .000 
 TR3_POLI 3.124E-03 .002 .146 1.492 .140 
 CORRUPTI -.283 .036 -.731 -7.961 .000 
 ALLO_SUB -1.567E-03 .039 -.003 -.040 .968 
 REMITTAN .339 .122 .213 2.772 .007 
 MED -8.723 52.899 -.233 -.165 .870 
 FUELEX -4.369E-02 .029 -.115 -1.511 .136 
 INTM_RE .271 .369 .451 .737 .464 
 INTM_PO 4.071E-02 .028 .154 1.462 .149 
 INTM_AL -.351 1.233 -.395 -.285 .777 
 INTM_RM .416 1.699 .115 .245 .807 
Note: Dependent variable: IEFOF8. 
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A.3.3. Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions  
Table 21: Correlation Matrix of Parameter Estimates 
 IEFOF8 TECHREAD OPENNESS POP05 FUELEX DISTEQ 
IEFOF8 1.0000000 -.7773116 -.4560445 .2404496 .2266667 -.3468416 
TECHREAD -.7773116 1.0000000 .3148483 -.1520143 -.1288850 .1828208 
OPENNESS -.4560445 .3148483 1.0000000 .1916568 .1418694 .0213755 
POP05 .2404496 -.1520143 .1916568 1.0000000 .2210015 -.3175293 
FUELEX .2266667 -.1288850 .1418694 .2210015 1.0000000 -.1525927 
DISTEQ -.3468416 .1828208 .0213755 -.3175293 -.1525927 1.0000000 
MED .5206459 -.4898376 -.1585642 .1156642 .0249982 -.0263763 
GULF .0266990 -.1348945 -.0632035 -.0574059 -.2353157 .2128796 
SSA -.1539097 .1325037 .1954888 -.0933116 .0440900 .6472329 
LAC -.2888012 .0619905 .2787223 -.1061951 -.0408215 .6489984 
EAP .3096521 -.3899943 -.2994267 -.3296592 -.0674299 .4680810 
OECD -.3023703 -.1042793 .2923385 .0129699 .0189943 -.0658707 
       
 MED GULF SSA LAC EAP OECD 
IEFOF8 .5206459 .0266990 -.1539097 -.2888012 .3096521 -.3023703 
TECHREAD -.4898376 -.1348945 .1325037 .0619905 -.3899943 -.1042793 
OPENNESS -.1585642 -.0632035 .1954888 .2787223 -.2994267 .2923385 
POP05 .1156642 -.0574059 -.0933116 -.1061951 -.3296592 .0129699 
FUELEX .0249982 -.2353157 .0440900 -.0408215 -.0674299 .0189943 
DISTEQ -.0263763 .2128796 .6472329 .6489984 .4680810 -.0658707 
MED 1.0000000 .1590694 .1608677 .1432101 .3817070 .0587921 
GULF .1590694 1.0000000 .1796239 .2307286 .2455201 .1119687 
SSA .1608677 .1796239 1.0000000 .6184377 .4038624 .0820453 
LAC .1432101 .2307286 .6184377 1.0000000 .3953381 .3290207 
EAP .3817070 .2455201 .4038624 .3953381 1.0000000 -.0006352 
OECD .0587921 .1119687 .0820453 .3290207 -.0006352 1.0000000 
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Table 22: 2SLS: Coefficients  
  Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std.Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 2.562 .086  29.650 .000 
 TECHREAD .324 .021 .816 15.315 .000 
2 (Constant) 1.514 .311  4.877 .000 
 IEFOF8 .024 .006 .492 3.873 .000 
 TECHREAD .186 .040 .490 4.658 .000 
3 (Constant) 1.348 .341  3.959 .000 
 IEFOF8 .028 .007 .570 3.823 .000 
 TECHREAD .169 .044 .445 3.882 .000 
 OPENNESS -.000 .001 -.014 -.181 .857 
 POP05 .000 .000 .075 1.050 .297 
4 (Constant) .925 .408  2.266 .026 
 IEFOF8 .035 .008 .716 4.143 .000 
 TECHREAD .135 .050 .351 2.704 .009 
 OPENNESS .000 .001 .021 .260 .795 
 POP05 .000 .000 .117 1.483 .142 
 FUELEX .004 .001 .200 2.550 .013 
5 (Constant) 1.473 .380  3.876 .000 
 IEFOF8 .022 .008 .460 2.795 .007 
 TECHREAD .161 .042 .421 3.850 .000 
 OPENNESS -6.601E-05 .001 -.006 -.095 .924 
 POP05 .000 .000 .058 .862 .391 
 FUELEX .003 .001 .154 2.338 .022 
 DISTEQ .007 .002 .264 3.436 .001 
6 (Constant) 1.699 .451  3.771 .000 
 IEFOF8 .018 .009 .370 1.986 .051 
 TECHREAD .171 .043 .454 3.950 .000 
 OPENNESS 9.363E-05 .001 .009 .138 .891 
 POP05 .000 .000 .042 .624 .535 
 FUELEX .002 .001 .124 1.724 .089 
 DISTEQ .008 .002 .308 3.658 .001 
 LGCONFL .001 .047 .002 .021 .984 
7 (Constant) 2.180 .434  5.018 .000 
 IEFOF8 .008 .009 .164 .908 .367 
 TECHREAD .211 .041 .558 5.161 .000 
 OPENNESS .000 .001 .019 .319 .751 
 POP05 2.189E-05 .000 .007 .116 .908 
 FUELEX .002 .001 .087 1.348 .182 
 DISTEQ .009 -.002 .361 4.433 .000 
 LGCONFL -.010 .043 -.016 -.240 .811 
 MED -.081 .121 -.045 -.669 .506 
8 (Constant) 1.309 .898  1.458 .149 
 IEFOF8 .026 .019 .529 1.334 .187 
 TECHREAD .149 .087 .389 1.716 .091 
 OPENNESS -2.596E-05 .001 -.002 -.34 .973 
 POP05 .000 .000 .071 .723 .472 
 FUELEX .003 .002 .155 1.647 .104 
 DISTEQ .006 .003 .242 2.008 .049 
 MED 1.141 1.531 .613 .745 .459 
 INTM_TE -.023 .211 -.048 -.109 .913 
 INTM_INT -.017 .031 -.532 -.563 .575 
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  Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std.Error Beta t Sig. 
9 (Constant) 4.062 1.251  3.248 .002 
 IEFOF8 -.031 .026 -.633 -1.197 .236 
 TECHREAD .374 .109 .991 3.433 .001 
 OPENNESS .000 .001 .040 .515 .609 
 POP05 -.000 .000 -.121 -1.073 .287 
 FUELEX -.002 .003 -.121 -.853 .397 
 DISTEQ .014 .004 .532 3.526 .001 
 MED -.142 1.592 -.078 -.089 .929 
 LGCONFL -.083 .066 -.132 -1.262 .211 
 INTM_TE -.501 .279 -1.075 -1.795 .077 
 INTM_INT .030 .034 .939 .870 .387 
10 (Constant) 1.173 .811  1.447 .152 
 IEFOF8 .029 .017 .593 1.657 .102 
 TECHREAD .135 .077 .352 1.750 .084 
 OPENNESS -.000 .001 -.015 -.203 .840 
 POP05 .000 .000 .083 .890 .377 
 FUELEX .003 .001 .168 2.095 .040 
 DISTEQ .006 .003 .230 1.989 .051 
 MED .091 .194 .049 .468 .641 
11 (Constant) 3.771 1.021  3.692 .000 
 IEFOF8 -.025 .021 -.510 -1.181 .242 
 TECHREAD .350 .090 .926 3.896 .000 
 OPENNESS .000 .001 .046 .638 .526 
 POP05 -.000 .000 -.098 -1.024 .310 
 FUELEX -.002 .002 -.090 -.759 450 
 DISTEQ .013 .003 .497 3.976 .000 
 MED 1.228 .729 .678 1.685 .097 
 LGCONFL -.080 .061 -.126 -1.313 .194 
 INTM_ME -.403 .212 -.865 -1.905 .061 
12 (Constant) 2.340 .437  5.353 .000 
 IEFOF8 .010 .009 .196 1.027 .308 
 TECHREAD .163 .047 .426 3.470 .001 
 OPENNESS 9.652E-05 .001 .009 .133 .894 
 POP05 8,074E-06 .000 .003 .043 .966 
 FUELEX .002 .001 .084 1.323 .191 
 DISTEQ .006 .003 .213 1.971 .053 
 MED .432 1.172 .232 .369 .713 
 INTM_TE -.093 .147 -.194 -.632 .530 
 INTM_INT -.002 .022 -.060 -.088 .930 
 GULF .212 .225 .052 .942 .350 
 SSA -.251 .121 -.167 -2.080 .042 
 LAC .036 .101 .030 .351 .727 
 EAP .037 .126 .024 .290 .773 
 OECD .197 .082 .200 2.410 .019 
13 (Constant) 2.274 .413  5.508 .000 
 IEFOF8 .011 .009 .230 1.281 .205 
 TECHREAD .153 .043 .398 3.517 .001 
 OPENNESS 3.290E-05 .001 .003 .045 .964 
 POP05 2.061E-05 .000 .007 .110 .913 
 FUELEX .002 .001 .100 1.727 .089 
 DISTEQ .005 .003 .209 1.944 .056 
 MED -.020 .124 -.010 -.157 .876 
 GULF .206 .224 .051 .920 .361 
 SSA -.254 .121 -.169 -2.103 .039 
 LAC .034 .101 .029 .340 .735 
 EAP .046 .125 .031 .371 .712 
 OECD .201 .082 .205 2.470 .016 
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Table 23: Model Summary 
Model R R2 Adjusted 
R2
Std. Error  
of the Estimate 
1a .816 .665 .662 .291 
2b .821 .675 .667 .267 
3c .817 .668 .651 .277 
4d .815 .664 .641 .291 
5e .873 .762 .743 .237 
6f .883 .779 .756 .227 
7g .898 .806 .783 .211 
8h .865 .748 .716 .251 
9i .859 .739 .699 .261 
10j .855 .731 .705 .258 
11k .874 .764 .733 .242 
12l .913 .833 .797 .205 
13m .911 .829 .798 .205 
a Predictors: (Constant), TECHREAD 
b Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD 
c Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05 
d Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX 
e Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ 
f Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, LGCONFL 
g Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, LGCONFL, MED 
h Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, MED, INTM_TE, INTM_INT 
i Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, LGCONFL, MED, INTM_TE, 
INTM_INT 
j Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, MED 
k Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, MED, LGCONFL, INTM_TE  
l Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, MED, INTM_TE, INTM_INT, GULF, 
SSA, LAC, EAP, OECD  
m Predictors: (Constant), IEFOF8, TECHREAD, OPENNESS, POP05, FUELEX, DISTEQ, MED, GULF, SSA, LAC, EAP, OECD 
Table 24: Alternative Variables 
 Alternative Measures Description Source 
LGGDP PCGCP GDP per capita WDI 
 Growth10 average annual growth, 1995–2005 WDI 
 Growth5a average annual growth, 1995–2000 WDI 
 Growth5b average annual growth, 2000–2005 WDI 
OPENNESS OPENH freedom of trade IEF 
 OPENKK fitted trade openness Kaufmann et al.(2005) 
MACROST MACROSH monetary freedom IEF 
ECONINST PROP property rights WDI 
TECHREAD Sciedev ISTC RAND 
 Procsoph process sophistication WEF 
 Innocap innovative capacity WEF 
 Patents number of patents filed by residents WDI 
 Technic number of technicians and researchers WDI 
 Techabs technology absorption WEF 
RENTSEEK RENT_ODA total amount of ODA WDI 
 Rent_Rem remittances as percent of GDP WDI 
ALLOSTA ALLO_Em compensation of employees as percent  
of government expenses 
WDI 
 ALLO_Sub subsidies and other transfers as percent  
of government expenses 
WDI 
DUMMY D_LAC Latin America and Caribbean  
 D_EAP East Asia and Pacific  
 D_ECA Europe and Central Asia  
 D_SSA sub-Saharan Africa  
 D_OECD OECD countries  
 D_GCC members of the Gulf Cooperation Council  
 D_MED Arab Mediterranean country  
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